We introduce a new cryptographic tool that we dub entangled encoding scheme. An entangled encoding allows a set of users to encode their files into a single digital "clew" such that the following two properties are satisfied. (1) Privacy: The resulting encoding reveals no information about the files contained inside the clew; (2) All-or-nothing integrity (AONI): It is impossible to modify or delete any significant part of the encoding without affecting all files contained in the clew.
INTRODUCTION
The terminology "cloud computing" refers to a paradigm shift in which applications from a server are executed and managed through a client's web browser, with no installed client version of an application required. This paradigm has generated new intriguing challenges for cryptographers. Here, we deal with the problem of cloud storage, where clients store their files on remote servers. Outsourcing data storage provides several benefits, including improved scalability and accessibility, data replication and backup, and considerable cost saving.
Nevertheless, companies and organizations are still reluctant to outsource their storage needs. Files may contain sensitive information and cloud providers can misbehave. While encryption can help in this case, it is utterly powerless to prevent data corruption, whether intentional or caused by a malfunction. Indeed, it is reasonable to pose the following questions: How can we be certain the cloud provider is storing the entire file intact? What if rarely-accessed files are altered? What if the storage service provider experiences Byzantine failures and tries to hide data errors from the clients? Can we detect these changes and catch a misbehaving provider? PDP/POR. It turns out that the questions above have been studied extensively in the last few years. Proof-ofstorage schemes allow clients to verify that their remote files are still pristine even though they do not possess any local copy of these files. Two basic approaches have emerged: Provable Data Possession (PDP), introduced by Ateniese et al. [2] , and Proof of Retrievability (POR), independently introduced by Juels and Kaliski [22] (building on a prior work by Naor and Rothblum [24] ). They were later extended in several ways in [27, 5, 14, 4] . In a PDP scheme, file blocks are signed by the clients via authentication tags. During an audit, the remote server is challenged and proves possession of randomly picked file blocks by returning a short proof of possession. The key point is that the response from the server is essentially constant, thanks to the homomorphic property of authentication tags that makes them compressible to fit into a short string. Any data alteration or deletion will be detected with high probability. In POR, in addition, error correction codes are included along with remote file blocks. Now, the server provides a proof that the entire file could potentially be recovered in case of hitches.
Data entanglement. The main shortcoming of proof-ofstorage schemes is that a successful run of an audit provides evidence about the integrity of a remote file only at a given time. As a consequence, all users must challenge the storage server regularly to make sure their files are still intact.
An alternative approach has been proposed by Aspnes et al. [1] , under the name of data entanglement. The main idea is to make altering or deleting files extremely inconvenient for the cloud provider. To achieve this feature, the authors of [1] considered a setting where many clients encode all their files into a single digital clew 1 c, that can be used as a representation of all files and be stored on remote and untrusted servers. The goal is to ensure that any significant change to c is likely to disrupt the content of all files.
Unfortunately, the original model of [1] suffers from an important shortcoming: The entanglement is created by a trusted authority, and files can only be retrieved through the trusted authority. Although the assumption of a trusted party significantly simplifies the task of designing (and analyzing) protocols for data entanglement, it also makes such protocols not suitable for cloud computing.
Our Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is to overcome the above limitation, by putting data entanglement into a more generic framework. We do so by introducing a new abstraction (which might be of independent interest), which we dub entangled encoding scheme; as we prove entangled encodings are a natural stepping stone for generically realizing the approach of data entanglement.
Entangled encodings. Informally, an entangled encoding consists of an algorithm Encode that takes as input n strings f1, . . . , fn (together with a certain amount of randomness r1, . . . , rn), and outputs a single codeword c which "entangles" all the input strings. The encoding is efficiently decodable, i.e., there exists an efficient algorithm Decode that takes as input (c, ri, i) and outputs the file fi together with a verification value ξ. Since only ri is required to retrieve fi (we do not need rj, for j = i), we refer to this as "local decodability". The verification value is a fixed function of the encoded string and the randomness.
In addition, the encoding satisfies two main security properties. First off, it is private 2 in the sense that even if an adversary already knows a subset of the input strings and randomness used to encode them, the resulting encoding reveals no additional information about any of the other input strings other than what can be derived from the knowledge of this subset. Second, it is all-or-nothing in the sense that whenever an adversary has "large" uncertainty about c (i.e., a number of bits linear in the security parameter), he cannot design a function that will answer any decoding query correctly. See Section 3 for a precise definition.
We provide a concrete instantiation of an entangled encoding scheme based on polynomials over a finite field F. Here, the encoding of a string fi is generated by choosing a random pair of elements (si, xi) ∈ F 2 and defining a point (xi, yi = fi + si). The entanglement of (f1, . . . , fn) consists of the unique polynomial c(·) of degree n − 1 interpolating all of (xi, yi). In Section 3 we show that, if the field F is large enough, this encoding satisfies privacy and the all-ornothing integrity (AONI) property for a proper choice of the parameters. It holds even in case the adversary is computationally unbounded.
Entangled cloud storage. Given our new abstraction, we revisit the approach of data entanglement for secure cloud storage. The main idea is to compute the clew c as an entangled encoding of all files, and to store such encoding on the server. Additionally, we indicate how to implement the trusted party assumed by Aspnes et al. [1] via standard techniques from secure MPC. We refer to our framework as entangled cloud storage, which essentially consists of three phases.
• Setup phase: There are n clients P1, . . . , Pn each holding a file fi. The parameters of the underlying entangled encoding scheme are generated and made public.
• Entanglement phase: The clients take part to a secure n-party protocol πent,n to define the clew c ← Encode(f1, . . . , fn) consisting of an entangled encoding of all files (i.e., the creation of the clew is now distributed across all clients). Let r1, . . . , rn denote the randomness used to generate c.
• Recovery phase: At any point in time, a client Pi (holding ri) can recover fi by running a 2-party protocol πrec,2, and thus learning fi = Decode(c, ri, i). Note that, thanks to the local decodability property of the encoding, no interaction with other clients is required. 2 Looking ahead the privacy property is used to protect the confidentiality of the user's files in the cloud application; we stress that there are other ways of dealing with this (e.g., by using encryption), but we find it more elegant, and less cumbersome, to state privacy as a property of the encoding since our scheme achieves it (unconditionally) without significant overhead.
Intuitively, the security of protocol πent,n ensures that no information on the files is leaked to other clients during the entanglement phase; moreover, thanks to the privacy property of the encoding, the server has no information on the clients' files. Similarly, security of πrec,2 implies that the server does not learn anything on the client's file during the recovery phase. Finally, the AONI property of the encoding ensures that, whenever there is enough uncertainty about the clew c (e.g., because the server misbehaves and "forgets" part of the data it was supposed to store), no client will be able to recover its files, thus making it very inconvenient for the cloud provider to cheat.
One additional difficulty is that the client might not be able to store the entire ri (as this could be too long, and thus a client might as well store fi directly instead of ri). However, this is easily solved by having the client store only the seed σi of a pseudo-random generator G(·), and recover ri as the output of G(σi). Moreover each client Pi has to keep a hash of the original file fi, in order to make sure that the retrieved value corresponds to the original encoding (and not to a different one). We refer the reader to Section 4 for a more comprehensive discussion.
A concrete protocol. Finally, we design a concrete protocol for entangled cloud storage for the case where the clew c is computed using our entangled encoding scheme based on polynomials over a finite field F. The scheme additionally relies on a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme with message space equal to F.
Recall that in this case, each client has a file fi (represented as a field element in F), and the entangled encoding is defined by sampling ri = (si, xi) ← F 2 and defining (xi, yi = fi +si). Following the above general recipe, all that is left is to devise protocols (πent,n, πrec,2) for this entangled encoding scheme.
The protocol πent,n simply computes the coefficients of the polynomial c(·) of minimum degree interpolating all of (xi, yi). This can be done by using standard techniques based on linear secret sharing (see Section 4). The polynomial c(·) is stored at the untrusted server. The recovery phase can be implemented via the following protocol πrec,2. The client first forwards to the server a ciphertext e corresponding to an encryption of xi. The server returns an encryption of c(xi), computed through the ciphertext e and by exploiting the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The client can now decrypt the received ciphertext to obtain yi, and thus fi = yi − si.
Other Related Work
Data entanglement also appears in the context of censorship resistant publishing systems; see, e.g., [30, 31] .
The notion of all-or-nothing integrity is inspired by the all-or-nothing transform introduced by Rivest et al. [26] , and later generalized in [10, 13] .
PRELIMINARIES

Notation
Given an integer n, we let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. If n ∈ R, we write n for the smallest integer greater than n. If x is a string, we denote its length by |x|; if X is a set, |X | represents the number of elements in X . When x is chosen randomly in X , we write x $ ← X . When A is an algorithm, we write y ← A(x) for a run of A on input x and output y; if A is randomized, then y is a random variable and A(x; r) denotes a run of A on input x and random coins r.
Throughout the paper, we denote the security parameter by k. A function negl (k) is negligible in k (or just negligible) if it decreases faster than the inverse of every polynomial in k. A machine is said to be probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) if it is randomized, and its number of steps is polynomial in the security parameter.
Let X = {X k } k∈N and Y = {Y k } k∈N be two distribution ensembles. We say X and Y are computationally indistin-
The min-entropy of a random variable X is defined as H∞(X) = − log maxx P (X = x).
Basic Cryptographic Primitives
We briefly review some of the basic cryptographic building blocks used within our main construction.
be a deterministic function, where (k) > k. We say that G is a secure PRG if there exists a polynomial time algorithm that given σ ∈ {0, 1} k outputs G(σ), and moreover {G(σ) :
Collision resistant hashing. Let , : N → N be such that (k) > (k), and let I ⊆ {0, 1} * . A function family {Hι}ι∈I is called a collision-resistant hash family if there exists a deterministic algorithm that on input x ∈ {0, 1} and ι ∈ I outputs Hι(x), and moreover no PPT algorithm (given ι) can find x, x such that Hι(x) = Hι(x ).
Somewhat homomorphic encryption. A homomorphic (public-key) encryption scheme is a collection of the following algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval), defined as follows: (1) Upon input the security parameter, algorithm Gen outputs a secret and public key (sk , pk ) and an evaluation key evk; (2) Upon input a public key pk and a message µ, algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext e; (3) Upon input a secret key sk and a ciphertext e, algorithm Dec outputs a message µ. (4) Upon input an evaluation key evk, a function c : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * and a set of n ciphertexts e1, . . . , en, algorithm Eval outputs a ciphertext ec. An homomorphic encryption scheme is said to be compact if the output length of Eval evk (·) is bounded by a polynomial in k (regardless of the function c and of the number of inputs). An encryption scheme is fully-homomorphic when it is both compact and homomorphic with respect to the class C of all arithmetic circuits over a finite field F (thus both addition and multiplication over F).
A somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme allows to compute functions c(·) of "low degree" and it is used as a subroutine of fully homomorphic encryption [17] (applying a "bootstrapping" or re-linearization technique of [8, 7] to perform an unbounded number of operations). We use SHE in our scheme since it is significantly faster than FHE.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC
n , where φ = (φ1, . . . , φn) is a random process that for every input (x1, . . . , xn) produces some output (y1, . . . , yn). We often denote this by (x1, . . . , xn) → (φ1(x1), . . . , φn(xn)).
An n-party protocol π φ,n for φ is a procedure by which n parties (each holding private input xi) communicate in order to learn φi(xi) (and nothing more). Security of π φ,n is defined by comparing an execution in the real world, where the protocol is deployed and an adversary can corrupt a subset of the parties, with an execution in an ideal world, where all the clients give their inputs to a trusted party which then computes the output for them. Following the standard nomenclature, we say that π φ,n securely realizes φ. We speak of passive corruption when corrupted parties stick to the protocol description; in case of active corruption, instead, corrupted parties can behave arbitrarily. We refer the reader to, e.g., [18] for formal definitions.
ENTANGLED ENCODING SCHEMES
In this section, we introduce the notion of an entangled encoding scheme and show a construction based on polynomial interpolation. Intuitively, an entangled encoding scheme encodes an arbitrary number of input strings f1, . . . , fn into a single output string using random strings r1, . . . , rn (one for each input string). We assume that all input strings have the same length . 3 The following definition captures an entangled encoding scheme formally.
Definition 1 (Entangled Encoding
). An entangled encoding scheme is a triplet of algorithms (Setup, Encode, Decode) defined as follows.
Setup. Setup is a probabilistic algorithm which, on input a security parameter k, the number of strings to encode n, and the length parameter , outputs public parameters (F, R, C). We call F the input space, R the randomness space and C the entanglement space.
Encoding. Encode is a deterministic algorithm which, on input strings f1, . . . , fn ∈ F and auxiliary inputs r1, . . . , rn ∈ R, outputs an encoding c ∈ C.
(Local) Decoding. Decode is a deterministic algorithm which, on input an encoding c ∈ C and input ri ∈ R together with index i, outputs string fi ∈ F and a verification value ξ. This value must be a fixed function ξ(fi, ri) of the file and the randomness.
Correctness of decoding requires that for all security parameters k and length , public parameters (F, R, C) ← Setup(1 k , n, ), input strings f1, . . . , fn ∈ F and auxiliary inputs r1, . . . , rn ∈ R, we have for all i ∈ [n] (fi, ξ(fi, ri)) = Decode(Encode(f1, . . . , fn; r1, . . . , rn), ri, i) .
Security Properties
We let Fi and Ri for i = 1, . . . , n be random variables representing the choice of fi and ri, respectively. We make no assumption on the distributions of Fi and Ri, but note that of course the distribution of Ri will be fixed by the encoding scheme. We let F−i (resp., f−i) denote the set of all variables (resp., values) except Fi (resp., fi). Similar notation is used for Ri and ri. An entangled encoding scheme satisfies two main security properties.
Privacy: Even if an adversary already knows a subset of the input strings and randomness used to encode them, the resulting encoding reveals no additional information about any of the other input strings other than what can be derived by the knowledge of this subset. More precisely, let U denote some arbitrary subset of the pairs (Fj, Rj)j=1...n, and let C be the encoding corresponding to all elements, i.e., C = Encode(F1, . . . , Fn; R1, . . . , Rn). Let V be the set of Fi not included in U , i.e., V = F−U . An entangled encoding scheme is private if, for all u ∈ U and all c ∈ C, the distribution D V |U of the random variable V when given U = u is statistically close to the distribution D V |U C of the random variable V when given (U = u, C = c), i.e.,
All-Or-Nothing Integrity: Roughly speaking, if an adversary has a large amount of uncertainty about the encoding C = Encode(F1, . . . , Fn; R1, . . . , Rn), he cannot design a function that will answer decoding queries correctly. More precisely, let U be defined as under privacy, and define a random variable C U that is obtained by applying an arbitrary (possibly probabilistic) function g(·) to U and C. Now the adversary plays the following game: he is given that C U = c for any value c and then specifies a function Decode Adv . We say that the adversary wins at position i if Fi is not included in U and Decode Adv (Ri, i) = Decode(C, Ri, i). The encoding has (α, β) all-or-nothing integrity if H∞(C|C U = c ) ≥ α implies that for each i, the adversary wins at position i with probability at most β. In particular, in order to win, the adversary's function must output both the correct file and verification value.
Definition 2 (All-or-Nothing Integrity). We say that an entangled encoding scheme (Setup, Encode, Decode) has (α, β) all-or-nothing integrity if for all possibly unbounded adversaries A, for all subsets U ⊂ {(Fj, Rj)}j=1...n, for all possibly unbounded functions g(·) and for all i ∈ [n] \ {j : (Fj, Rj) ∈ U }, we have that
where the probability is taken over the choices of Fi, Ri and the coin tosses of A).
Note that β in the definition of all-or-nothing integrity will typically depend on both α and the security parameter k, and we would like that β is negligible in k, if α is large enough. We cannot ask for more than this, since if α is small, the adversary can guess the correct encoding and win with large probability.
A Code based on Polynomials
We now design an encoding scheme that has the properties we are after. As a first attempt, we consider the following. We choose a finite field F, say of characteristic 2, large enough that we can represent values of Fi as field elements. We then choose x1, . . . , xn uniformly in F and define the encoding to be c, where c is the polynomial of degree at most n − 1 such that c(xi) = fi for all i. Decoding is simply evaluating c. Furthermore, the all-or-nothing property is at least intuitively satisfied: c has degree at most n and we may think of n as being much smaller than the size of F. Now, if an adversary has many candidates for what c might be, and wants to win the above game, he has to design a single function that agrees with many of these candidates in many input points. This seems difficult since candidates can only agree pairwise in at most n points. We give a more precise analysis later.
Privacy, however, is not quite satisfied: we are given the polynomial c and we want to know how much this tells us about c(xi) where xi is uniformly chosen. Note that it does not matter if we are given xj for j = i, since all xj are independent. We answer this question by the following lemma: Lemma 1. Given a non-constant polynomial c of degree at most n, the distribution of c(R), where R is uniform in F, has min-entropy at least log |F| − log(n).
Proof. The most likely value of c(R) is the value y for which c −1 (y) is of maximal size. This is equivalent to asking for the number of roots in c(X) − y which is at most n, since c(X) − y is not 0 and has degree at most n. Hence P(c(R) = y) ≤ n/|F|, and the lemma follows by definition of min-entropy.
It is reasonable to assume that c will not be constant, but even so, we see that the distribution of c(R) is not uniform as we would like, but only close (if n |F|). In some applications, a loss of log n bits in entropy may be acceptable, but it is also easy to fix this by simply one-time pad encrypting the actual data before they are encoded. This leads to the final definition of our encoding scheme:
Setup: Given as input the length of the n data items to be encoded and the security parameter k, define F = F = GF (2 max( ,3k+log n+log log n) ), R = F 2 and C = F n .
Encoding: Given f1, . . . , fn to encode, choose xi, si ∈ F uniformly (and independently) at random, and set ri = (xi, si); in case xi = xj for some index i = j output a special symbol ⊥ and abort. Otherwise, define Encode(f1, . . . , fn; r1, . . . , rn) = c to be the polynomial of degree at most n − 1 such that c(xi) = fi + si for i = 1, . . . , n.
It is trivial to see that decoding outputs the correct file. The verification value is c(xi) = fi + si. Thus, it is indeed a function of the file and the randomness, as required by the definition. The encoding is also easily seen to be private: In fact, by the uniformly random choice of si, given any subset U of (Fj, Rj)j=1...n the encoding C does not reveal any additional information on V = F−U . For all-or-nothing integrity, we have the theorem below. Its conclusion may seem a bit complicated at first, but in fact, reflects in a natural way that the adversary has two obvious strategies when playing the game from the definition: he can try to guess the correct encoding, which succeeds with probability exponentially small in α, or he can try to guess the correct field element that is computed at the end of the game (by making his function constant). However, the latter strategy succeeds with probability exponentially small in |F|. The theorem says that, up to constant factor losses in the exponent, these are the only options open to the adversary.
Theorem 1. The encoding scheme from above has (α, max(2 −k+2 , 2 −(α−3)/2 )) all-or-nothing integrity.
Before coming to the proof of Theorem 1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let U , C U be as in the definition of all-ornothing integrity and suppose the pair (Fi, Ri) = (Fi, (Xi, Si)) is not included in U . Then for the encoding scheme defined above, and for any c , we have H∞(Xi| C U = c ) ≥ log |F| − log n.
Proof. Suppose first that we are given values for all Fj, Rj where j = i and also for C and Fi, i.e., we are given the polynomial c, all fj and all (xj, sj), except (xi, si). Let V be a variable representing all this. Before a value of V is given, xi, si are uniformly random and independent of the fj's and of the (xj, sj) where j = i. It follows that when we are given a value of V , the only new constraint this introduces is that c(xi) = si +fi must hold. Now, if c is constant, this gives no information at all about xi, so assume c is not constant. Then for each value si, it must be the case that xi is in a set consisting of at most n elements, since c has degree at most n − 1. Therefore we can specify the distribution of xi induced by this as follows. The set of all xi is split into at least |F|/n subsets. Each subset is equally likely (since si is uniform a priori), and the elements inside each subset are equally likely (since xi is uniform a priori). Each subset is, therefore, assigned probability at most n/|F|, and thus, also the largest probability we can assign to an xi value (if the subset has size 1). Therefore, the conditional min-entropy of Xi is at least log |F| − log n. Now observe that the variable C U can be obtained by processing V using a (possibly randomized) function. If we assume that a value of C U is given, the conditional minentropy of Xi is at least as large as when V is given. This actually requires an argument, since it is not the case in general that the min-entropy does not decrease if we are given less information. In our case, however, if we are given U = u, the resulting distribution of Xi will be a weighted average computed over the distributions of Xi given values of V that map to U = u. But all these distributions have min-entropy at least log |F| − log n and hence so does any weighted average.
Proof of Theorem 1. We assume that the distribution D of the polynomial c in the view of the adversary has min-entropy at least α, so that the maximal probability occurring in the distribution is at most 2 −α . The adversary now submits his function Decode Adv , and he wins if (fi, c(xi)) = Decode Adv (xi, si) for an arbitrary but fixed i ∈ [n]. We want to bound the adversary's advantage.
In particular, the adversary's function must output the correct value of c(xi), so we may as well bound the probability that g(xi) = c(xi) for a function g chosen by the adversary, where c is chosen according to D and xi has large min-entropy as shown in Lemma 2 above.
Let c be the probability that g(xi) = c(xi) for a fixed c, then = c qc c where qc is the probability assigned to c by D. A standard argument shows that P( c ≥ /2) ≥ /2 since otherwise the average c qc c would be smaller than .
Consider now the distribution D which is D restricted to the c's for which c ≥ /2. The maximal probability in this new distribution is clearly at most 2 −α+1 / . It follows that D assigns non-zero probability to at least 2 α−1 polynomials. We now define C be a subset of these polynomials. There are two cases: (1) if 2 α−1 ≤ 3 |F|/n, we set C to be all the 2 α−1 polynomials in question; (2) otherwise, we set C to be an arbitrary subset of 3 |F|/n polynomials. We now define a modified game, which is the same as the original, except that the polynomial c is chosen uniformly from C . By construction, we know that the adversary can win with probability /2 by submitting the function g. Now define, for ci, cj ∈ C , the set Xij = {x ∈ F | ci(x) = cj(x)}. And let X = ∪i,jXij. Since all polynomials in C have degree at most n − 1, it follows that |X | ≤ n|C | 2 . Note that if x ∈ X , then c(x) is different for every c ∈ C and one needs to guess c to guess c(x). We can now directly bound the probability we are interested in:
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2. Since we already know that there is a way for the adversary to win with probability /2, we have (2) we get ≤ 2 −k+3 . The theorem follows.
ENTANGLED CLOUD STORAGE
We show that entangled encodings are a natural tool for realizing the approach of data entanglement put forward by Aspnes et al. [1] . Recall that in this setting there is a set of n parties (called the clients) P1, . . . , Pn, each holding a file fi. The clients entangle their files into a digital clew c to be stored at an untrusted server, in such a way that each client can recover its own file from the clew and moreover any significant change to c completely destroys its content (in the sense that, after the clew is modified significantly, the server is not able to answer decoding queries consistently).
The two main differences between our approach and the one by Aspnes et al. are summarized below:
• In [1] , the entanglement of all files and the recovery of a single file is computed via a trusted party; in contrast, we consider a more realistic setting where no trusted party is available, and the entanglement (resp. recovery) procedure is distributed across all clients (resp. across the server and one of the clients).
• We define the clew using our abstraction of entangled encodings, and put forward a generic recipe for data entanglement; this way the AONI requirement (see Definition 2) is transferred from the encoding scheme to the cloud application.
To differentiate our framework from the one of [1] we refer to our setting as entangled cloud storage.
A Generic Protocol
Let (Setup, Encode, Decode) be an entangled encoding with input space F, randomness space R, and entanglement space
k → R be a pseudorandom generator, and {Hι}ι∈I be a set of collision resistant hash functions with input space F. Consider the following protocol π = (πent,n, πrec,2) for entangled cloud storage:
Setup Phase: The Setup algorithm of the underlying encoding scheme is run, and a description of (F, R, C), together with G(·) and Hι(·), is published.
Entanglement Phase: The clients P1, . . . , Pn (with Pi holding fi ∈ F) 4 sample uniform randomness σ1, . . . , σn ∈ {0, 1} k (with Pi sampling σi), define ri = G(σi) and engage in a secure n-party protocol πent,n realizing the functionality 5 ( ((f1, r1) , . . . , (fn, rn)), −) → ((− . . . , −), c), where c = Encode(f1, . . . , fn; r1, . . . , rn). The clew c is stored at the remote server S; client Pi keeps (σi, θi) where θi = Hι(fi).
Recovery Phase: Client Pi (holding σi, θi) and the server S (holding c) engage in a secure 2-party protocol πrec,2 realizing the functionality
where fi ∈ F is the recovered file and d is a decision bit indicating whether the recovered value is accepted by the client.
Security analysis.
We proceed with a sketch of the security analysis of the above protocol. One can check that the following properties are satisfied:
• Privacy of entanglement: At the end of the entanglement phase, no information about the file fi is leaked to the other (possibly malicious) clients. This follows directly from the security of the sub-protocol πent,n. Moreover, a (possibly malicious) server, even colluding with a subset of the clients, does not learn any information on the honest clients' files. The latter property holds unconditionally, and follows directly from the privacy requirement of the underlying entangled encoding scheme.
• Privacy of recovery: At the end of the recovery phase the server learns nothing on fi; this follows directly from the security of the sub-protocol πrec,2.
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• AONI: Whenever the server modified a significant part of the clew, it cannot fool a client Pi to believe that his data is still in place, or into accepting a different file f i = fi. This follows from the AONI requirement of the encoding scheme, and the collision resistance of the hash family.
Put differently, the probability that a cloud provider answers correctly a recovery query for some file is essentially the same for all files which are part of the 4 Strictly speaking one needs to consider a way to parse binary strings into elements of F. 5 By a celebrated result in secure MPC, every functionality can be realized securely [32, 19] . 6 The exact type of security (e.g., passive or active) clearly depends on the specific protocol πent,n. 7 Again, the exact type of security achieved (e.g., passive or active) depends on the specific protocol πrec,2.
entanglement: such probability is either one (in case the server did not modify the clew), or negligibly close to zero (in case the clew was modified).
One might object that, in practice, it is not enough that the above properties hold independently. Indeed, the fact that each building block is secure does not mean that their composition preserves security of the entire construction. In the full version of this paper [3] we show that the approach sketched above still works, even in case one is worried about such composition guarantees. See also Section 5.3 for a discussion.
A Concrete Instantiation
We proceed to describe a concrete instantiation of the above paradigm, for the case of our entangled encoding scheme based on polynomials over a finite field F. Following our generic recipe, all we have to do is to define the sub-protocols (πent,n, πrec,2) for the encoding scheme of Section 3.2.
Entanglement phase. We describe a protocol πent,n that securely realizes the functionality φent,n for the entangled encoding scheme of Section 3.2. The protocol can be based on certain types of sharing schemes summarized below:
• Threshold additively homomorphic encryption (e.g., [25, 15] ). Such a scheme has the following properties: (1) To share a value a party can encrypt it using the public key of the cryptosystem and broadcast the ciphertext; (2) An encrypted value can be opened using threshold decryption; (3) Given Enc pk (µ1), Enc pk (µ2) and plaintext µ3, parties can compute Enc pk (µ1 + µ2) and Enc pk (µ3 · µ1) non-interactively; (4) Given Enc pk (µ1) and Enc pk (µ2), parties can compute Enc pk (µ1 · µ2) in a constant number of rounds.
• Linear secret sharing (e.g., [28, 16] ). Such a scheme has the following properties: (1) Parties can share a value in a constant number of rounds; (2) Parties can open a value in a constant number of rounds; (3) Given shares of values µ1, µ2 and value µ3, parties can compute shares of µ1 + µ2 and µ3 · µ1 non-interactively; (4) Given shares of values µ1 and µ2, parties can compute shares of µ1 · µ2 in a constant number of rounds.
In what follows we say that a value is shared if it is distributed according to one of the above two methods; similarly a matrix or a polynomial are shared if all the elements of the matrix or the coefficients of the polynomial are shared. Let F be a finite field. Consider the following linear system A · c = b, where
. . .
and A is a Vandermonde matrix. Note that if the xi's are distinct, A is non-singular and can thus be inverted yielding the vector c = A −1 · b containing the coefficients of the polynomial c(X) of minimal degree interpolating all (xi, yi).
Denote with A = (A[1], . . . , A[n] ) the rows of A and with b = (b[1] , . . . , b[n]) the elements of b. The following protocol πent,n runs with clients Pi holding an input (xi, yi) ∈ F 2 , and is based on [6] .
Each Pi shares A[i] and b[i].
2. Clients share a random non-zero invertible matrix R (this can be done in constant rounds [6] ), compute the shares of R · A, and reveal the result.
3. Each Pi computes the shares of (R · A)
and thus
4. Each Pi computes the shares of A −1 ·b non-interactively.
5. For all j ∈ [0, n − 1], let si,j be the share of c[j] held by Pi. Client Pi forwards si,j to the server, that can reconstruct the clew c(·).
The above protocol requires a constant number of rounds and O(n 3 ) multiplications of shared values. (Recall that in turn each multiplication of shared values requires interaction.) An improvement can be found in [23] , with only O(n 2 ) multiplications. Se also [12] for a more efficient protocol requiring an additional assumption.
The type of security we achieve depends on the particular sharing scheme we employ. In case of passive adversaries, the protocol above is secure for adversary structure ∆ = Q2 (i.e., no two sets in ∆ cover the entire set of clients). In case of active adversaries, we can tolerate ∆ = Q3 (i.e., no three sets in ∆ cover the entire set of clients) by using verifiable secret sharing or zero-knowledge proofs (∆ = Q2 assuming a broadcast channel). For instance, in case protocol πent,n is instantiated using verifiable secret sharing (with no broadcast channel available), and setting yi = fi + si for (si, xi) = G(σi), we obtain the following statement:
Theorem 2. Protocol πent,n above securely realizes φent,n, with active corruptions.
The proof follows directly by the result in [6] , and is deferred to the full version.
Recovery phase. Let (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) be a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme with input space F. We describe a protocol πrec,2 that securely realizes the functionality φrec,2 for the entangled encoding scheme of Section 3.2.
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To retrieve fi, client Pi (with public key pk i and secret key sk i) first computes (si, xi) = G(σi) and then interacts with the server S as follows:
1. Pi computes e ← Enc pk i (xi) and sends it to S.
2.
S computes e * = Eval evk i (c(·), e).
3.
Pi computes c(xi) = Dec sk i (e * ) and outputs fi = c(xi) − si if and only if Hι(fi) = θi.
Theorem 3. Protocol πrec,2 above securely realizes φrec,2, with active corruptions.
In the full version of this paper we discuss several variants of the above protocol, leading to different efficiency trade-off.
DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We conclude with a discussion of some issues inherent to entangled cloud storage, and with a list of open problems and interesting directions for future research.
Comparison to PDP/POR
One might ask how data entanglement relates to the approach based on PDP/POR. We make a few observations in this respect below:
1. As in PDP/POR, the cloud provider is strongly discouraged from misbehaving. In addition, any single client implicitly operates on behalf of all clients in the sense that the client, while inspecting the soundness of his own files, implicitly checks for the integrity of the files of all other users. Thus, the disincentive to misbehave in entangled cloud storage is stronger than in PDP/POR since a dishonest cloud provider will likely be prosecuted by all users rather than only by the affected ones.
2. From a practical perspective, users within entangled cloud storage do not have to keep constantly querying the cloud provider with proof-of-storage challenges as in PDP/POR schemes. No user has to explicitly request a file to check for its integrity. As long as other clients are able to retrieve their own files, everybody else in the system will be ensured that their files are intact.
3. Whenever a client fails to recover a file, it could be because the server deleted or modified it or is simply refusing to hand it over. A dishonest client could in principle frame the cloud provider by falsely claiming his files are unrecoverable. Fortunately, though, any other client can establish the truth and expose the villain by successfully retrieving any of his own files. This property cannot be realized within existing PDP/POR schemes where the cloud provider is always susceptible to blackmail.
The advantages described above come at a price: Users must coordinate and run an expensive procedure to build the entanglement. Much more work must be undertaken to improve the efficiency of our solutions and render them practical.
Alternative Solutions
We showed how to realize entangled cloud storage using our abstraction of entangled encodings. Of course, it should be considered whether entangled cloud storage can be realized in other ways.
A first natural idea is to upload each file in encrypted form to the server. Whenever a file is retrieved, a proof of retrievability (POR) for the entire set of (encrypted) files is also executed between the client and the server. We believe such a solution would satisfy our definition of entangled cloud storage. However, there are two impeding drawbacks to consider. First, a POR scheme requires a redundant encoding of the data, hence the server needs more storage than strictly necessary. Second, the local computation performed by the client in a POR scheme typically depends on the total size of the remote data (but see also [29] for a more efficient POR-based approach). In our scenario, this is not acceptable since it makes the work of the client depend on the total number of clients. In contrast, our entangled encoding has size exactly equal to the encoded data (when files are large enough) and the work performed by a client is independent of the number of clients.
A different idea would be to encrypt each file and then upload them to the server in a randomly permuted order, such that each client knows the position of his own file. A client may use private information retrieval (PIR) to retrieve files. This way the server remains oblivious of the relative position of any file, even after several retrievals. At first, this solution may seem good enough to deter the server from erasing files. But note that the server could correctly estimate any file positions with non-negligible probability, possibly with the help of malicious clients. Most importantly, this proposal based on PIR does not actually satisfy the AONI requirement. Indeed, the server may end up excluding some clients while allowing others to still retrieve their files. Entangled cloud storage mandates that no client can retrieve data whenever a significant part of it is erased.
Proving Security in the UC Framework
For space reasons, we kept the security analysis of our protocol for entangled cloud storage at an informal level. A natural extension would be to formalize an ideal functionality that captures all the necessary security properties required for entangled cloud storage, and then to show a protocol securely realizing such an ideal functionality in the universal composability (UC) framework of Canetti [9] .
We warn the reader that while the UC model gives strong composition guarantees, it also introduces further technical difficulties. The main problem we have to face is that if the server is corrupt it may choose to overwrite the encoding we give it with something else, and so we may enter a state where the server's uncertainty about the encoding is so large that no request can be answered. Now, in any simulation based definition, the simulator must clearly know whether we are in a such a state. But since the server is corrupt we do not know how it stores data and therefore it is not clear how the simulator could efficiently compute the server's uncertainty about the encoding. In the UC model it is even impossible because the data could be stored in the state of the environment which is not accessible to the simulator.
In the full version of this paper [3] we show how to deal with the above issues, and prove that essentially the same protocol considered in Section 4 is actually sufficient for proving security in the UC framework.
Efficiency Considerations
We stress that our work does not focus on performance optimization and the proposed scheme should be interpreted more as a feasibility result and as the first instantiation of an entangled cloud storage scheme. Moreover, a direct comparison of efficiency between our entangled cloud storage and known PDP/POR constructions is inappropriate since the properties those primitives provide are critically different as emphasized above.
Nonetheless, one way to "control" the performance of our construction is by making sure that the polynomial, which represents the entanglement, has a low degree. One natural way to achieve this is by limiting the number of users who take part to the entanglement and create several smaller clews. This would offer a clear trade-off between security and efficiency.
At the extreme, entangled cloud storage can also be used by a single user to entangle his own files and then outsource the corresponding clew to the cloud. This way, no coordination step is required, leading to a significantly more efficient scheme. Quite remarkably, this allows the user to verify that all files are still in place by recovering just one of them. For instance, as long as the user downloads regularly accessed files (e.g., family pictures), he can be sure any other files are still intact, even those rarely retrieved (e.g., tax returns).
Open Problems
An important property for protocols dealing with the problem of cloud storage, is to allow clients to update the encodings of their files without re-computing the encoding from scratch. In a full dynamic setting clients should also be allowed to add/delete files from the cloud storage provider.
The quest for the above properties is particularly important for entangled cloud storage, as the entanglement phase is interactive. 9 We stress that, in principle, our generic protocol for entangled cloud storage would also support dynamic updates provided that the underlying entangled encoding does so. However, we do not know how to deal with dynamic updates for the concrete scheme based on polynomial interpolation (see Section 3.2 and 4.2). We leave it as an open problem to construct such a scheme.
Finally, it would be very interesting to find new constructions of entangled encoding schemes. Thanks to our generic recipe in Section 4, this would immediately imply new protocols for entangled cloud storage as well.
